The right to assemble in Convention is the most extreme consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the people.
Example of a convention which I saw in America and which will, better than any other, serve to make clear what a
political convention is; for there are conventions concerned with every subject.
One knows how greatly the question of tariff or free trade has stirred men's minds in the United States. One
might say that the tariff question arouses the only political passions that there are in the Union, because tariffs favor or
harm, not opinions only, but very powerful material interests. The North attributes part of its prosperity, and the South
almost all of its troubles to them.
About two months ago Mr. Sedgwick, the brother of Miss Sedgwick the authoress, who also lives in the little
village of Stockbridge in Massachusetts where I saw him, thought of proposing by publicity in papers to all the
opponents of tariffs that they should send deputies to Philadelphia and appoint a convention to advise on the best means
whereby to achieve the freeing of trade. This idea, which spread in a few days by the power of the press from Maine
to New Orleans, was favorably taken up by all the States whose interests were concerned for or against. The opponents
of tariffs got stirring on all sides and appointed deputies to make representations to Congress. These deputies were
almost all very distinguished men; one saw among them the names of Gallatin, Berian (?) and many men known in the
South; the Carolinas alone sent 60 deputies.
On 1st October 1831 the assembly, which consisted of more than 200 members, was constituted in
Philadelphia. The discussions were public, and from the first day took on a thoroughly legislative character. Thus there
was a general argument about the extent of the power of Congress, the principle of the theory of free trade, and finally
the provisions in practice of the different tariff regulations of 1828. After ten days the assembly adjourned indefinitely,
after they had drafted an address to the American people. This address set forth that:
1st. Congress has not the right to impose a tariff, and the existing tariff was unconstitutional.
2nd. It is in the interest of peoples, and in particular of the American people, that freedom of trade should be
restricted.
Of all that I have seen in America it was that Convention which most struck me as being for a dangerous and
impracticable consequence of the sovereignty of the people.
(Tocqueville, p. 220)
Journal entry about conventions (based on interview with Mr. Ingersoll)
Today I was at the house of Mr. Ingersoll, a lawyer and former member of the legislature, and expressed
the views I have just written down. He answered me: "The dangers which alarm you are, in my view, less to be
feared; as long as men have freedom to talk, it is odds against their taking to action. Besides, note carefully, the
object of the Convention is not to act, but to persuade; it represents an opinion, an interest, and does not set out to
present the nations which is there, all complete, in Congress. The Convention, on the contrary, starts from the
assumption that it does not represent the majority, but wishes to act on public opinion and change the persuasion of
the majority."
"But," said I, "the opinion and interest of which you speak, could present their arguments any day by
means of the press."
"You realize," replied Mr. Ingersoll, "the immensely greater power of any assembly compared to an
obscure journalist, or the individual efforts of a man of parts. For my part I regard the right to assemble in a
convention as the rational consequence of the dogma of the sovereignty of the majority. There are some opinions
which, although they are shared by a minority, would forever be suppressed by the majority, unless, besides the
public assemblies which express the all-powerful wishes of the majority, there were not meetings (thus reinforced
by the moral power given by numbers) which argued for the interests of the minority, and which acted not by laws,
but by speeches designed to win over the majority itself."
"Very well," I answered, "certainly nothing is more logical, but I should not need other examples to show
to what extent the immutable laws of logic are inapplicable to the affairs of this world. Imagine a people not entirely
accustomed to the rule of laws and the reign of persuasion; grant it passions and great political interests; allow that
besides the majority that makes the laws, there arises a minority which is only concerned with the preamble and
stops short at the recital, and you will see what happens to public order. Do you not see that in the minds of almost
all men there is but a step, and the easiest step of all to take, between proving that a thing is good -- and carrying it
out? Besides are there not certain political questions where the majority is so uncertain that each party can claim that
it is the majority?
"So you allow the creation besides the directing power of a power whose moral authority is as great and
which nonetheless, feeling that it has the strength to struggle against the established order, will respect it on account
of this metaphysical consideration that the Convention's function is to enlighten opinion and not to coerce it, to
counsel and not to act."
Mr. Ingersoll admitted that he had spoken only with reference to the United States, and only with reference
to the present time. "As we can without danger conform to our principles," he said, "we do well to do so. Besides
my view has always been that one should make the laws for the peoples, and not the peoples according to the laws. I
conceive that an assembly like the Philadelphia Convention could entail great dangers in France.
However it seems to me that association against the outsider has some analogy with our use of
Conventions. What renders Conventions so dangerous for you is the concentration of the whole of France in Paris. I
conceive that a factious assembly held in Paris could have a destructive power over the whole State. There is
nothing like that in America. Speaking generally, I am firmly persuaded that as long as you do not grant a strong
individuality to your provinces, you will never be sure of remaining free."
(Tocqueville, p. 222)
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